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An odd thing about the Indonesian military is that regardless of the absence of voting rights for servicemen, their leaders are no strangers to the world of politics. During the Suharto era, the military was the backbone of the authoritarian regime. It is widely believed that the racial riots that led to the killings of innocent people in May 1998 were closely linked to a fierce competition for power among generals who were anticipating the chaotic political situation following President Suharto’s downfall.

When the top brass from the military, also known as TNI, became upset with the policies of former President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, they were determined to make an alliance with the then vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to impeach him.

Today, active military leaders are not allowed a role in politics. However, that does not necessarily mean they are entirely in the shadows.

The TNI’s commander has an enormous amount of political clout by the virtue of the fact that he controls all of the military’s regional command structures down to the district level.

The president cannot underestimate the influence of the TNI commander in providing security and stability at the national and regional levels.

Therefore, it is only logical that the president would choose someone he really trusts to fill the top military position. There has been some suggestion during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s rule that the TNI commander is guaranteed of becoming the next coordinating minister for political, legal and security affairs.

Both former TNI Chief Adm. (ret.) AS Widodo and his successor, Air Marshal (ret.) Djoko Suyanto, went on to occupy this senior ministerial post.

This is an indication that there is always a temptation for the president to capitalize on the support of the military to strengthen his power.

It is telling to note how Yudhoyono reacted to the issue of voting rights for servicemen. He was a bit circumspect in saying that it all depended on deliberations over the Law on Elections in the House of Representatives.

His stance is understandable: He does not want to openly the deny the constitutional rights of the servicemen, but at the same time he realizes the political ramifications of large numbers of new voters.

He knows that all political parties will fight for these votes, and certainly his Democratic Party does not want to be handicapped in that competition.

There are other concerns. First, as a newly democratic state, Indonesia is undergoing a comprehensive program of security sector reform.

So far, a lot of progress has been achieved in the accomplishment of the principle of civilian rule. However, there is no room for complacency.

Much of the claimed progress in security sector reform is related to the institutional frameworks both for the military and the police. The real progress should be measured by the actions — and inactions — of the two security institutions.

Not only have past human rights violations by the military been left unresolved, but alleged torture of political prisoners in Papua remains a big issue.

Thus, there is still unfinished business in the whole reform process. People still doubt the integrity of the military, and therefore question whether it deserves the right to participate in future elections.

Second, at the institutional level, there is no guarantee that all military leaders will have one voice in articulating the standpoint of their institution.

This observation becomes all the more valid if they themselves are competing to win the favor of the political leaders.

For instance, TNI Chief Gen. Djoko Santoso and Army Chief Gen. George Toisutta recently made conflicting statements on the right to vote for soldiers.

While the former appeared to be more reform-minded by saying the military would follow whatever decision came from the president and the House, the latter made a strong demand for military voting rights in the 2014 elections.

Third, at the individual level, it is not yet clear how far TNI personnel have internalized the new vision and mission of their reformed institution in an era of civilian rule.

During Suharto’s New Order, military leaders at all levels used to enjoy certain political and economic privileges.

Now under the new political system, they have been deprived of all the previous benefits to the extent that the welfare of servicemen has become a critical issue.

Granting voting rights to military personnel without a plan to improve their economic welfare may lead to quid-pro-quo deals between military leaders and political parties.

If that is the case, then the healthy process of state-building will be ruined and we will all have to bear the calamitous consequences.