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If you travel around Southeast Asia these days, you will notice that the banyan trees are not what they used to be.

The banyan tree, under which very little else can grow, was for long a metaphor for authoritarianism in this region. That tree is now being pruned so that democracy can thrive.

The latest developments in Burma reveal how real that pruning is. The “civilianized” government there has reduced the military’s political role, relaxed tight controls on the local media, begun regular meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi, and acknowledged popular demands by halting a controversial hydroelectric dam project.

These are small gestures by democratic standards, but they are significant by what were Burma’s standards until now. Its politics was a garden of weeds. Although flowers are not about to bloom in it any time soon, some undergrowth has been cleared.

As dramatic changes come to the fore in the new regional landscape, Indonesia provides a vantage point from which to survey progress towards democracy in several countries.

The downfall of the Indonesian dictator Suharto in 1998 paved the way for democracy to emerge in Southeast Asia’s largest nation. Few expected it to take root because Indonesia is replete with racial, religious, regional and linguistic fault lines.

However, democracy entrenched itself in the Indonesian imagination. Political parties grew in size and sophistication. Independent agencies contributed to the maturing of the political process. The growth of NGOs, a vibrant media and a dynamic online community reflected the nation’s political diversity.

Recognizing this plurality soon became a norm: The old, authoritarian penchant for enforced uniformity was gone. Most important, a basic national consensus emerged on the need for democracy and secularism.

Differences exist over policies but they are resolved within the largely accepted parameters of a non-theocratic and democratic state.

Even terrorism and religious extremism have been brought within the ambit of the new politics. Jakarta has adopted tough security measures without undermining democratic practices. Indeed, democracy has allowed it to isolate and de-legitimize extremists by casting them out of the mainstream, although a growing fringe of violent extremist groups continues to test the system. Corruption is a major issue. Critics also argue that Indonesia has a flawed democracy, which has been captured by vested interests.

Notwithstanding these problems, democratization has become an irreversible reality in Indonesia. So has it in Thailand. There, the debate is not over the need for democracy but over the kind of democracy the country needs. Should it be Westernized in structure, or should it be guided by Thai custom and tradition? Should a party that wins a majority of seats, by whatever means, be allowed to rule almost as an elected dictatorship, or should there be unelected independent agencies to act as checks on power?

For a long while, King Bhumibol’s role as the national guardian provided an overarching framework within which such questions could be posed. But he is advancing in years and is in poor health. In the circumstances, class and regional divisions have come to the fore.

Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose sister now holds the top elected post, dominated Thai politics by using populist policies to win massive support among the rural poor. He alienated and then enraged the Bangkok-based elite, both royalist and liberal, with his economic populism and his extra-legal policies, which included a murderous crackdown on drug traffickers.

Today, even as Thaksin remains in exile, he is consolidating power by reshuffling officials and distributing government largesse to different social groups. He is likely to retain the political initiative for some time. At some point, though, he will have to engineer his return to Thailand. That is when he will galvanize opposition to him. He is a highly divisive personality who cannot forge any working compromise on issues that split the country. However, neither Thaksin nor his detractors can reverse the democratic turn in Thai politics. It has evolved to the point where the military, royalists or other powerful forces have to work through the democratic system, and not against it, in order to advance their objectives. This is a far cry from the times when the military, for example, could act with impunity as a separate source of power, distinct from the democratic process and exercising sway over it.

Over in Malaysia, democracy took an unexpected, although not an entirely unsuspected, turn more than three years ago. In the March 2008 general election, the ruling National Front coalition lost its two-thirds majority for the first time since it had been formed in 1971. With 81 seats in Parliament, the opposition alliance was only 31 seats short of a majority. In September that year, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim came close to securing sufficient defectors to oust the federal government.

Corruption, cronyism, nepotism and other abuses of power — ills accumulated over authoritarian decades led to this shocking state of affairs for the ruling coalition. Even more fundamental was the abuse of affirmative action policies. Originally intended to help the poor across the racial spectrum, they became instead a form of state patronage favoring rich Malays.

Yet again, though, Malaysia demonstrates how democracy provides a mechanism of correction. Responding to the debacle at the general election, Prime Minister Najib Razak responded with plans for a liberalization of pro-Malay policies that would spark growth and enable the government to fairly divide the economic pie.

Predictably, there was an upsurge of resistance from right-wing Malay groups. However, Najib has succeeded in regaining the political initiative from the opposition in a way that few in 2008 believed would be possible. With the next general election widely expected early next year, he is preparing to go on the offensive on a reformist platform that harnesses Malaysia’s economic potential to the need for political pluralism. If he succeeds, democracy would be further entrenched.

Singapore too has begun a transition. The ruling People’s Action Party led by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong secured 60.2 percent of the vote in the May 2011 general election, its worst showing since independence.

A measure of political uncertainty has re-entered the landscape of a country long accustomed to PAP rule. Singapore, however, enjoys the key ingredients of stability for the long term: institutional strength, a pragmatic political culture, and the system’s ability to adjust to change.

The banyan tree is still there, but it is being pruned.

 

The Business Times

Derwin Pereira heads Pereira International, a Singapore-based consulting company.