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Indonesia’s macroeconomic indicators have generated a lot of enthusiasm about the nation’s economic future, both inside and outside the country.

The country’s GDP has grown robustly, on average 5.6 percent annually between 2005 and 2009 and with a further 6.1 percent added in 2010. Inflation, at the same time, has been kept at bay, averaging 8.8 percent between 2005 and 2009, 7 percent in 2010, and just 2.9 percent year-to-date 2011. (And it must be said that many analysts are of the opinion that in an international comparison, the Indonesian inflation number is overestimated. Unlike in most other countries, the Indonesian “basket of goods” used to calculate inflation includes gold — the price of which has increased by more than 300 percent since 2005.)

This has allowed Bank Indonesia to keep its main lending rate historically low, which is seen as good for business as it keeps investment costs low. And as it has caused international investors to flock to Indonesia looking for short- and long-term investment opportunities, it has also provided a great boost to the nation’s foreign currency reserves, which are said to work as a buffer, isolating a country from global economic shocks.

However, if the current financial crisis, which began to affect the United States in 2008 before moving on to all of the developed Western economies, has taught anything, it is that macroeconomic statistics should not be judged at face value. They should first be analyzed to see what drove them.

Judging by the same macroeconomic indicators, throughout much of the 21st century, the United States seemed a very healthy economy — right up until crisis struck. Between 2000 and 2007, US GDP grew by an average of 2.4 percent annually, and most economists at the time considered this a “healthy” growth percentage for a developed economy.

Only a few economist aired concerns. They pointed to the fact that many Americans were increasing their consumption by taking on ever bigger loans. Their suspicion was that increased lending was driving American growth, and they asked just how sustainable this kind of growth could be.

In late 2007, their question was answered. Millions of American families could no longer carry the burden of their debt and they began to default on their loans en masse. This shocked first America, and then the whole Western world, into a major economic crisis.

But the event could have been seen coming. Excluding the increase in household debt, the US economy had been “growing” by on average -5 percent annually between 2000 and 2007. Given the 2.4 percent average annual growth rate in the GDP figure, this was a clear sign that something was going horribly wrong and that the United States was heading for economic doom. The official GDP growth number kept it hidden.

Back to Indonesia, where the economic success of the past few years is usually “explained away” by pointing to the export sector. And indeed, Indonesia has grown richer due a widening gap between the value of its exports and the value of imports. From 2005 to 2010, this gap increased annually by on average 32.2 percent or Rp 21.8 trillion (or $2.3 billion using the 2005-2010 average exchange rate).

However, because a large part of Indonesia’s exports sail under the flag of international corporations, around half of this inflow of foreign money ends up being repatriated abroad: on average Rp 11.1 trillion annually since 2005. This means that on a net basis, “exports” have instead been making Indonesia richer to the tune of on average Rp 10.7 trillion annually since 2005. A sizeable amount, for certain. But it still amounts to only 0.39 percent of Indonesia’s 2005 GDP. In other words, contrary to common perception, the export sector has not been the driving force behind Indonesia’s GDP growth.

So then, what does explain Indonesia’s GDP success?

When earlier the international credit rating agencies upgraded Indonesia’s credit rating, they also cited “strong domestic demand growth” as a main reason for their decision. Driving this domestic demand growth in Indonesia is credit. Since 2005, mortgage credit has increased by on average 28.3 percent, or Rp 18 trillion, annually. Over the same period, other consumer credit has increased by on average 23.8 percent, or Rp 66 trillion, annually.

If one were to correct the Indonesian GDP growth numbers for this increase in consumer borrowing, following the above example of the United States, the following picture emerges: 2006 GDP growth excluding consumption financed by debt was 3.5 percent, rather than the official 5.5 percent. In 2007, the numbers are 2.2 percent versus 6.3 percent; in 2008, 0.4 percent versus 6 percent; in 2009, 0.4 percent versus 4.6 percent; and in 2010, 0.6 percent versus 6.1 percent.

Clearly, therefore, the real driving force behind Indonesia’s growing GDP is debt.

The good news in this analysis is that unlike the United States from 2000-2007, even without the increase in consumer debt, Indonesia’s economy is still growing. A credit crisis similar to the one experienced by the United States is therefore not likely to hit Indonesia in the immediate or even intermediate future.

The bad news is that excluding the growth in consumer debt, Indonesia’s economic performance is a whole lot less impressive. And that brings back memories of the 1997 crisis.

In the run up to those terrible days, Indonesia was also posting impressive macroeconomic statistics. And just as now, that brought great optimism about the economic future of Indonesia. Foreign investment flooded the country and local banks increased their lending substantially. That optimism turned sour, however, when the Thai government was forced to devalue the Thai baht. This made foreigner investors nervous, and they responded by bringing home from Asia most of their funds. The rupiah then plummeted in value, leaving many Indonesian companies with debt they could no longer service as it was denominated in foreign currency. As these changes in the economic situation forced local banks to scale back their lending, they effectively brought the economy to a standstill. Overnight, Indonesia went from being an Asian Tiger to an IMF beggar.

The growth numbers excluding the increase in consumer debt show that today a similar overoptimism exists regarding Indonesia’s economy. The bulk of the Indonesian success is built on the most shaky of foundations, namely debt.

External economic events that are in essence unrelated to the Indonesian economy, such as the global financial crisis, therefore again have the potential to wreak havoc on the domestic economy. For even if only some of the current optimism is spoiled, credit could quickly dry up. And this could then set in motion a spiral of events similar to those of 1997.

Idries de Vries is a Jakarta-based economic and geopolitical affairs analyst.