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Indonesia’s national legislature is no longer the rubber-stamp system that it was in former President Suharto’s days. It is one of the most powerful political institutions in the country that in theory balances the powers of the presidency. Expectations were therefore high when the members elected to the current legislature, from 2009–2014, were, on average, better educated and younger than previous chambers.

But one year into their tenure, critics already faulted the legislature, or DPR, for its performance. Few bills have been passed — 16 out of a targeted 70 — while its members continue to be defensive in the face of public outcry over allegedly luxurious facilities, overseas trips and corruption cases. It is no surprise that numerous polls suggest high public dissatisfaction with the DPR.

Some of these criticisms may have merit, but a closer look at the institutional and political dynamics within the DPR suggests that assessing legislative performance is not so straightforward.

First, constitutionally, a bill must be formulated and discussed by both the legislative and executive branches of government. This process can often be highly complicated and slow, especially with the politicking that takes place within the government ministries themselves.

Take the ongoing discussion of the Social Security Provider Agency bill. Many lawmakers are frustrated with the complex and slow process of working with eight ministries — each with their own bureaucratic and political interests. Not to mention that each ministry has its own interpretation of the bill and how it relates to other laws and bills.

So when one considers that the government — as the co-producer of a bill — is often not cooperative and has its own interests, the small number of bills passed can also be seen to reflect the executive’s sluggish procedures and processes in working with the legislature.

Second, critics overlook the fact that the DPR has a number of internal barriers that impede its performance. To name a few: size and quality of the support system, such as expert staff and secretariat staff, poor documentation for public hearings and working trip reports, as well as a lack of effective mechanisms to evaluate the policy impact of every hearing. Many lawmakers and their staff often mention how factional leadership and parties have not yet provided significant policy input to support lawmakers’ performance.

Third, critics tend to focus on the number of bills passed, but fail to take into account the whole process of policy formulation and deliberation within the legislature.

A positive development is that there appears to be a more responsive and inclusive policy formulation and deliberation process within the DPR.

There is growing awareness of the importance of responding to public controversies, channeling constituents’ aspirations, as well as involving civil society organizations in policy formulation and deliberation. It is quite common for lawmakers and committees to receive policy input directly from academics, media and local NGOs through formal public meetings and direct relationships.

But, on the other hand, this policy formulation and deliberation process is often pre-empted by intervention from the president’s Joint Secretariat (SETGAB), a communication forum for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s coalition parties to support the government’s agenda in legislature.

While its effectiveness in ensuring a unified stance among the coalition parties is debatable, the growing involvement of the Secretariat in deciding key policy and parliamentary affairs bypasses existing mechanisms within the DPR and in its relationship with the executive. Such an “extra-parliamentary arena” arguably reduces the importance of the existing deliberation and policy formulation processes within the DPR itself.

Finally, critics often fail to take into account the nature of the DPR as a forum for political contestation between and within parties, as well as among individual politicians. The nature of Indonesia’s presidential system coupled with a large number of parties has often exacerbated the contest, which further complicates the deliberation and policy formulation process within the DPR.

Because of the multiplicity of political parties represented in the DPR, there is often little predictability and consistency governing the relations among them.

Overall, a more nuanced and balanced assessment of the performance of Indonesia’s legislature is necessary. Otherwise, we are just telling one side of the story.

Hazelia Margaretha is a senior research officer with the Center for Democratic Institutions at the Australian National University and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. This article was first published in East Asia Forum.