•    HOME   
•    NEWS   
•    BUSINESS   
•    INTERNATIONAL   
•    TECH   
•    SPORTS   
•    LIFE & TIMES   
•    OPINION   
•    MY JAKARTA   
•    BLOGS   

According to the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, a National Board on Antiterrorism will be luanched later this year. In forming such a body, the government would do well to address a number of shortcomings in its approach to counterterrorism.

First of all, the board needs to involve all stakeholders related to combating terrorism in Indonesia.

Although the main institutions include the National Police, the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Justice and Human Rights Ministry, the board must also actively engage other government departments and NGOs.

This is the only way to guarantee that the board and its actions are transparent, inclusive and representative.

Second, given the involvement of a wide variety of stakeholders and institutions, the board needs to clearly define roles for all involved parties.

The chief of the board is the primary decision maker, reporting directly to president.

The position should be held by the National Police, not the BIN or the military, as it is important that the body operates under the civil legal system.

The BIN and the military, however, can play an important role in providing expertise in intelligence gathering and analysis.

As chief of the board, only the National Police has the authority to arrest terror suspects.

The BIN and the military can only do so when the terrorists are from separatist groups or located overseas.

Third, the government needs to allocate a special operational budget for the board with the National Police, again, being the institution in charge of its management.

To avoid corruption, the board must allow the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and anticorruption NGOs such as Indonesia Corruption Watch to monitor its finances.

Fourth, it is also necessary to ensure that the board does not repeat human rights abuses similar to those committed by the notorious New Order Regime’s Operation Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib).

This will require the board to involve the National Commission for Human Rights and other human rights NGOs to monitor its handling of individuals suspected of terrorism or terrorist detainees.

The board will also need to permit its staff to be legally prosecuted if they violate human rights.

Fifth, the board should take into account the current disconnect between counterterrorism efforts at the national versus the local level.

It would be wise for the board to open up branches at the district level if it wants to prevent terrorist attacks.

Village heads would be able to report suspicious activities in their villages to the board’s district offices, and these reports could then be assessed and forwarded to the national office if the threat is deemed serious.

Aside from administration, there are three key issues the board needs to address to guarantee success.

First and foremost the board will need to place emphasis on intelligence analysis.

To do so it should include a division similar to the Australian Office of National Assessment.

The board should employ experts, particularly on Islam-related terrorism, and be open to input from terrorism research institutions.

There is an urgent need for such a division, since, as reported by the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Palembang and Aceh terror plots last May were detected largely by accident, rather than through good intelligence gathering and analysis.

One of the jobs of this division would be to evaluate the types and level of terrorist threats and assign relevant agencies to each threat.

For instance, in the event of a terrorist infiltration of the Indonesia-Philippine sea border, the board would deploy the Navy’s antiterror squad (Denjaka), and not Detachment 88, because Denjaka has greater expertise and training in this arena.

An important part of intelligence gathering involves interrogation, and to this effect the board should recruit Indonesia’s best interrogators to legally extract information from detainees.

The board must avoid the use of torture in interrogation at all costs.

According to Jack Cloonan, a former FBI interrogator of Al Qaeda suspects, it does not aid collection of intelligence, but it only breeds more terror by convincing radicals of the legitimacy of jihad against governments that torture.

Next, one of the board’s primary tasks must be to tackle “preradicalization,” the stage between soemeone’s introduction to radical ideas and their actually joining a radical group.

Targeting non-radical group members, the board will need to work with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education and moderate Islamic NGOs to create a peaceful and tolerant curriculum and to monitor its implementation at mosques and Islamic schools or centers.

Through these ministries and NGOs, the board can compile a database of those community members who are showing signs of radicalization and use it to form a plan for engaging these members.

Finally, it is important that the board manage the Indonesian deradicalization program. The ICG has prescribed some thoughtful recommendations regarding this.

Though difficult, the problem of prison corruption must be solved, and prison guards should take courses that help them identify signs of radicalization.

It is also necessary for the board to regulate military training conducted by civilians.


Muh Taufiqurrohman holds a master’s degree in international relations from Parahyangan Catholic University (UNPAR) in Bandung.