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The crisis over the solvency of Greece’s finances is much more than a monetary issue. It raises deep questions about the European project whose broad success over the past half-century is now clouded by doubts about the future. One thing seems certain though: With the dream of a united Europe receding, the EU will be too preoccupied with internal cohesion to play a significant global role.

The latest crisis burst upon the scene after increasing signs of faltering by the EU. This year has not begun very well for the 27-nation European Community. It may be the world’s major multinational grouping with a $16.5 trillion economy and a comfortable way of life for most of its citizens. It may have taken former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe into its democratic tent. It may be able to boast of having headed off the perennial armed conflict that marked the continent’s earlier history. But when it comes to global clout, the community is generally seen to be weak. US President Barack Obama showed his lack of interest by declining to attend a summit in Madrid this spring.

Beyond the prospect of a rolling crisis spreading across the continent, the current situation shows a fundamental and unresolved question that has dogged the European project since its earliest days. Put simply, this involves the relationship between member states and the supranational structure erected to encompass the community. Forty years ago, President de Gaulle of France fought a lengthy battle to curb the power of the supranational entity, as represented by the Commission based in Brussels. He launched an alternative plan for a system in which countries worked together but in which each government had the last word.

That foundered on opposition from federalist-minded Belgian and Dutch leaders. But de Gaulle’s vision has become reality. Though the Commission lies at the core of the EU, key decisions are taken by national governments. Political unity remains elusive because none of the major players — Germany, Britain and France — are ready to surrender the degree of national authority needed to make it work.

So we get the appointment of Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton as the lowest common denominators whom the big European powers think they can dominate, bypass or simply ignore.

The euro was meant to be different, a monetary union with a strong European Central Bank based in Frankfurt. It pleased the Germans to wage war on inflation and establish the euro as a world currency. It has succeeded in both respects, but there was always a flaw in its foundations.

The assumption was that once a common monetary policy was in place, common economic policies would follow. The architect of the single market in Europe, Jacques Delors saw the euro as the precursor to political union. The Greek crisis has shown the fallacy of this reasoning. Economic policies have not been aligned and there is an imbalance between the surplus and deficit nations in the euro zone — Mediterranean countries on one side, Germany and the Netherlands on the other.

The obvious answer for Greece and others in trouble would be to devalue. But in a common currency zone that is impossible. Britain, outside the zone, has been able to let sterling’s value fall. But Greece cannot do that. As for boosting exports, it has no recourse to a currency advantage within the euro zone and, as one acid observer remarked, how many things does Greece make that Germans want to buy?

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that there is no mechanism to transfer funds from rich to poor member states — hence the current scrabbling to find an improvised solution to Greece’s travails. There is also a problem further north. Europe’s main economic locomotive, Germany, suffers from weak domestic demand, making it too dependent on exports. Chancellor Angela Merkel shows little inclination to alter that, particularly since growth forecasts for her country are turning negative. Even if Greece started to make goods the Germans want, consumers in the EU’s biggest country are not buying much.

The outlook, therefore, must be for spending cuts by governments, starting with Greece. Demand will fall. Growth will be curtailed. Countries with strong state finances like Germany and the Netherlands will look askance at the idea of moving to a true economic and monetary union which could saddle them with responsibility for bailing out profligate southerners. The dream of a political federation which has been around since the 1950s will remain just that, a dream, and Europe is likely to spend 2010 even more focused than before on its internal problems, and even less able to play a strong global role.

Jonathan Fenby’s biography of Charles de Gaulle, “The General,” will be published in June. Copyright YaleGlobal 2010, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.