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The international order in the 21st century is likely to revolve around climate change, which is why so many countries and regions are jockeying for a leadership position on the issue. Handling it will require a shift away from the conventional concept of an international order that is determined by military might.

Climate change is, by itself, an enormous threat to human society. Its primary cause, of course, is the excessive use of fossil fuels and the fact that not only economic activities but also contemporary daily life and even military power are dependent on energy.

With emerging recognition of the seriousness of climate change, it has become clear that greenhouse gas emissions are now a constraint on the use of energy. Therefore, unlike in the past, energy security is now constrained by climate change policy, not just related to it. And those who can secure as-yet unexploited resources such as renewable energy and low-carbon fuel will end up as leading powers in the international politics of the next generation. This may not be single-nation hegemony, since renewable resources are diffuse in origin, not centralized as with oil fields or coal mines.

Another major departure is that instead of using military power to control another country, domestic policies will strongly impact international politics, and new technologies for conservation and renewable energy will be needed globally. National policies that promote sound environmental technologies will be crucial to securing markets.

Despite its stagnant outcome, the December 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen was a symbol of converging interests. It was supposed to serve as the first step to determine a new kind of international system. The heads of state of about 120 countries participated in a gathering that normally would see cabinet-level officials leading delegations.

Although green growth strategies seem a domestic issue at a first glance, they are deeply linked to the international community and the growing political will to create a low-carbon society. One sign of this is that prior to Copenhagen, many Asian countries pledged mid-term emission reduction targets.

In Asia and among emerging nations, Indonesia established the first mid-term emissions targets for 2020, even before China and India, as it seeks a leadership role on the climate issue. It is reminiscent of the leading role taken by Sukarno in the non-aligned movement that began with the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung. Indonesia’s ambitious promise was followed by other Asian nations as if it was a competition of target pledges in the period before Copenhagen. Singapore announced an ambitious target, and Maldives, which could find itself literally submerged by climate change, has pledged to be carbon neutral by 2019.

South Korea announced a 30-percent emission reduction target for 2020 from what is called the “business-as-usual” scenario, which represents a 4-percent reduction from 2005 levels. This is in line with Seoul’s green-growth policy package announced in 2008. Taking advantage of being a developing country under UN climate rules and also a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Seoul seems to be seeking leadership as a “bridge-builder” in multilateral negotiations.

A key player in climate talks due to both its economic power and its new distinction as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China followed with a target to reduce emissions as a percentage of GDP by 40 to 45 percent from 2005 levels by 2030. Finally, India pledged a 20 to 25 -percent reduction by 2020, and a 37-percent cut by 2030.

On one hand, these numbers show that politicians are finally taking steps toward a low-carbon earth. Although primary responsibility for ongoing climate change lies in developed countries, their efforts alone cannot solve the problem. Projections show that dangerous climate change cannot be avoided unless the responsibility to reduce emissions is shared with developing countries.

These numbers can also be seen as competition for leadership in the new world order of the 21st century. If the structure of the world has to be changed due to global warming, and if alternative energy sources and technology are still being sought, the chance to leap-frog the existing order and take the lead in the next generation of international politics is greater for developing countries.

In this regard, a “co-benefit” approach is attractive for Asia. In many Asian countries, air and water pollution are often seen as more pressing environmental issues than longer-term climate change. Pollution is an urgent matter but mounting global interest will provide more funding opportunities for climate change measures. A co-benefit strategy has the potential to be an important part of green growth, if the complex funding issues can be harmonized, thus allowing pollution and global warming efforts to be funded simultaneously — the first under traditional aid arrangements and the second under international protocols.

One possibility is to develop a decentralized regional framework involving multiple actors looking into specific issues.

We are at a moment in history in which the rules have changed, and the climate crisis will require creative thinking and a possible realignment of the international order. For Asia, this presents an opportunity to assert a greater leadership role on the world stage in terms of emissions targets, technology and regional cooperation. The future will belong to those nations who understand and seize the moment to go green.


Norichika Kanie is an Associate Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology. This piece is excerpted from the Winter 2010 issue of Global Asia, the journal of the East Asia Foundation.