•    HOME   
•    NEWS   
•    BUSINESS   
•    INTERNATIONAL   
•    TECH   
•    SPORTS   
•    LIFE & TIMES   
•    OPINION   
•    MY JAKARTA   
•    BLOGS   
•    EYEWITNESS   

On Sept. 17, 2001, President Megawati Sukarnoputri arrived in the United States. She became the first head of state to visit the country in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack that shocked the United States and the world.

On Sept. 19, Megawati gave a speech at the USINDO gala dinner. Written by politician Rizal Mallarangeng, the speech was eloquent and hit all the right notes. It stressed the importance of the US-Indonesia relationship, noted that the United States had been very influential in Indonesia and that Indonesia had a strong strategic importance with the country. It reminded the United States that Indonesia was a newly democratic country that had the largest Muslim population in the world and that it would be critical in maintaining regional stability and would be very important in America’s future “War on Terror.”

More important, Megawati stressed that despite the United States’ military embargo that had crippled Indonesia’s ability to defend itself, Indonesia was willing to help the United States in times of need. The help, however, was not free. Megawati commented on the challenges facing Indonesia, notably its limited resources and its own internal troubles of a financial crisis, corruption, separatism, GAM-led terrorism and ethno-religious conflicts that would hamper its ability to contribute to US interests — implicitly demanding some sort of quid pro quo.

Such a demand was not unethical. Rather, it is common in international relations that the stronger state, in this case the United States, should bring something to the table in exchange for support.

And the potential payoff for Indonesia was enormous. The United States could pressure its allies to stay out of Indonesia’s internal affairs; it could throw in a lot of much-needed economic and technical assistance; and it could lift the arms embargo on the Indonesian armed forces, accelerating their modernization. There were also trade concessions being dangled.

And there was reason to expect this kind of massive payoff. In October 2001, Frida Berrigan, a peace activist and research associate at the World Policy Institute who was not a fan of US-Indonesia rapprochement, complained in the World Policy Journal that President George W. Bush “promised Megawati economic aid totaling more than $700 million, including money for police training and civilian courses in defense under the E-IMET program [Expanded-International Military Education and Training]. Bush also expressed his desire to resume regular military contact, and lift the embargo on the sale of ‘non-lethal’ weapons.”

In essence, Indonesia would have received much of what it wanted from Washington without too much hassle or arduous negotiations, simply because Indonesia was in the right place at the right time.

Unfortunately, the Indonesian political elites did not think of the long-term interests of the nation, instead focusing on their own short-term interests and as a result blowing a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.

After the United States began bombing Afghanistan, Indonesian political leaders raced to condemn the action, simply to court the fabled “Muslim vote” that would supposedly bring an absolute majority in the legislature. Vice President Hamzah Haz demanded that the United States end the hostilities in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, faced with political pressure, Megawati quickly backtracked from her position of support for the United States.

Thanks to this, many of the offers that Bush put on the table were withdrawn. It was not until 2005 that the military assistance to Indonesia was partly carried out, and it was conditional on a yearly evaluation by the US secretary of state of conditions in Papua.

In 2008, the US foreign aid request for Indonesia was just $185.6 million. In contrast, Pakistan, which publicly opposed the US invasion of Afghanistan and covertly supported the Taliban, but allowed the United States to use its airspace to invade Afghanistan, benefited greatly from this double game. According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States waived nuclear weapons sanctions on Pakistan, rescheduled the country’s debts and provided both official and unofficial foreign aid totaling $20 billion.

In the meantime, in spite of Haz’s bold assertion that there were no terrorists in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah struck Bali with car bombs, killing 202 people in 2002. The bombing crippled Bali’s tourism for years, depriving Indonesia of much-needed income.

The tables were turned. Instead of Indonesia demanding payment from the United States for its cooperation, Indonesia had to ask for US assistance in its own “War on Terror,” helping the United States to fight its war without gaining as many economic benefits as it could have.

For Megawati, the Bali bombing inadvertently spelled the end of her presidency as it presaged the ascension of Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who in the aftermath of the bombing managed to show his leadership, his command and control of the situation. This later ushered him to the presidency, as ordinary people yearned for bold and decisive leadership, a proverbial stonewall in the middle of chaos caused by the greedy political class.

Ten years after 9/11, Indonesia’s internal situation is vastly improved. The terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah has been decimated, major ethno-religious conflicts are no longer seen as inevitable as people mature and understand the stupidity of such conflicts, and the country’s economy is growing.

Sadly, however, Indonesia’s political elites remain mired in their old ways of thinking, preferring political posturing in order to score short-term political gains, rather than doing something bold and decisive, and focusing on the long-term interests of the nation. Such thinking robbed Indonesia of its once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. It won’t be surprising if there is an encore.

Yohanes Sulaiman is a lecturer at the Indonesian Defense University.