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US President Barack Obama’s political philosophy has been the subject of intense debate in the United States. The protean nature of the president’s pragmatism leaves hardened ideologues frustrated, unable to plot his views on a simple x-y axis. But if you want to know where Obama stands, you need only examine the moral philosophy that undergirds his politics. In this, the most explicit common thread has been the need for empathy in policy making — placing the “empathy deficit” alongside the budget and trade deficits as structural problems that US strategy must address.

This is as true of Obama’s foreign policy as it has been of his decisions on health care and judicial nominees.

Indeed, in the preface to the second printing of “Dreams From My Father,” Obama speaks at length about the need for empathy in foreign policy.

We saw elements of this in his administration’s early approach to bilateral relationships in Asia.

The US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, to be signed when the president finally makes his long-delayed trip to the country next year, is an example of this effort.

The United States made clear early on that it was eager to address Indonesian and American concerns, because American interests were indeed more “comprehensive” than security and public health — two issues that had previously received much bilateral attention at American insistence — and because such a solicitous approach is likely to build a more durable partnership.

The focus on specific deliverables lends substance to the rhetoric despite the repeated delays in Obama’s visit.

On the broader issue of an Asian institutional architecture, however, the administration’s efforts have been less successful.

Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attempted to address concerns from Hobart to Hokkaido that Washington cared little about the region’s structure, announcing that the United States would join the East Asia Summit next year.

But across the region, many observers remain wary of the promise of long-term American commitment.

Asian partners have good reason for concern, not only because of the logistical difficulty in annually conveying the president across the Pacific Ocean (which, though illustrated in a particularly unsubtle manner by the continual postponements of this year’s planned visit, has long been a concern of officials on both sides of the Pacific when discussing US inclusion in any organization).

More problematic still, some of Obama’s advisers look at the noodle bowl of Asia-Pacific institutions — overflowing with complicated, thin and weak organizations — and wonder what the fuss is all about.

Like their predecessors in the administration of George W. Bush, they dismiss proposals for greater engagement with institutions that are not “results-focused.”

They fail to grasp that concerns about regional institution-building are based as much upon a preoccupation with the construction of regional identity as they are on economic arrangements or the balance of power.

The existence of these regional institutions, though their meetings result in very few deliverables, legitimize their members’ claims to inclusion in a regional community.

That legitimacy will allow members to make arguments for greater economic and strategic prerogatives within the community as the institutions mature.

The question of Asian identity, particularly for the liminal countries such as Australia and Japan, is thus foundational.

The failure here is one of empathy — empathy that can and should extend not only to the everyday concerns of those living in the region, but to these strategic preoccupations of their leaders.

Obama’s philosophy and background position him well to turn this failure into a success.

As the White House has noted several times in the last year, his personal identity is anchored to the region, as the first “Pacific President” — born and raised on Oahu and Java — and he has written eloquently of his formative struggle to shape his own identity.

His interest in empathy, moreover, ought to lead him to the realization that getting Asia right means showing up when invited — and not just for sentimental reasons, but because regional leaders view US participation and their leaders’ meetings as constructive of a regional identity that includes the United States.


East Asia Forum

Aaron Connelly is a Fulbright student fellow and a visiting researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta.